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Abstract 
 
I reviewed the published empirical evidence concerning journal peer review, which 
consisted of 68 papers, all but three published since 1975. Peer review improves 
quality, but its use to screen papers has met with limited success. Current procedures 
to assure quality and fairness seem to discourage scientific advancement, especially  
important innovations, because findings that conflict with current beliefs are often 
judged to have defects. Editors can use procedures to encourage the publication of 
papers with innovative findings such as invited papers, early-acceptance procedures, 
author nominations of reviewers, results-blind reviews, structured rating sheets, open 
peer review,  and, in particular, electronic publication. Some journals are currently 
using these procedures. The basic principle behind the proposals is to change the 
decision from whether to publish a paper to how to publish it 
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 Formal peer review is used to make decisions about who should receive grant money, who 
should be hired or promoted, and which papers should be published. A common thread here is the 
use of peer review to allocate scarce resources. This paper examines the use of formal peer review to 
decide how to allocate limited space in journals.1 
My impression is that most successful researchers find the current system of journal peer 
review to be effective. Journal peer review is commonly believed to reduce the number of errors in 
published work, to serve readers as a signal of quality, and to provide a fair way to allocate journal 
space. As an editor, referee, and author, I cannot recall a single instance in which a journal accepted 
a paper upon its first submission, without making suggestions for change. The changes almost 
always have led to improvements, although sometimes the level of effort and delays seemed 
excessive when judged against the benefits.  
 The primary concern of this paper is with the publication of innovative findings, or more 
precisely, the lack thereof. By innovation, I mean useful and important new findings that advance 
scientific knowledge. Such findings typically conflict with prior beliefs, for which Kuhn (1962) uses 
the term ?paradigm shift@. This concern on innovation is not often discussed directly in the  literature 
about peer review. In Stamps= (1997) classification of publications on peer review, only his 12th 
ranked topic,  ?conservatism,@ addressed issues related to innovative findings. 
First  I describe the procedures used to search for and interpret empirical findings on peer 
reviews. In this examination, I examine quality control, fairness to authors, and innovative findings. 
I then provide suggestions, mostly for editors, but also for reviewers and authors. 
 
                                                           
1 Horrobin (1996) reaches similar conclusions in his discussion of peer review for grant proposals. 
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 Procedures for the Literature Review 
I tried to review all published empirical literature on peer review. Searching for such studies 
is difficult because they are published in a variety of disciplines such as medicine, sociology, 
psychology, physics, engineering, social science, management science, and economics. Furthermore, 
the terminology that authors use in peer review varies, so it is difficult to locate relevant papers. The 
term ?peer review@ often does not appear in the titles, and the titles for many references in this paper 
would fail to alert the searcher.  
 Initially, I used references from key papers and books, such as Kupfersmid & Wonderly 
(1994). Then I circulated drafts of this paper to researchers; they told me about 43 additional 
relevant papers.  
After the initial search, I examined Speck=s (1993) annotated review. While he did not 
describe the procedure used to select studies, his search, which covered 1960 through 1991, was 
extensive. He found 643 academic papers on journal peer review. I coded his summaries and 
concluded that 101 of the papers provided empirical evidence. Some of these empirical studies were 
excluded because they were not relevant to the issues in this paper. Speck=s list and my review 
overlapped somewhat. Of the 38 empirical papers published by 1991 that I found, Speck cited only 
23, but he listed 13 that I had overlooked. I located 17 papers published since Speck=s book, bringing 
the total to 68. These empirical studies are denoted by AE@ at the end of the  references. Some of 
these papers are reviews of several empirical studies, so the total number of empirical studies 
exceeds the number of papers cited here.  
The empirical peer review literature is of recent origin. All but three of the 70 studies were 
published since 1975. Papers reporting on experimental (or quasi-experimental) studies are of 
particular interest: twelve exist and they tend to be controversial. These studies are denoted by ?X@ at 
the end of the references. 
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Most of the empirical research focused on fairness and quality; researchers have paid little 
attention to innovation. For example, in coding the 101 empirical studies annotated by Speck, I 
found only four directly related to innovation.  
In March 1996, to help ensure that my interpretations of the studies were correct, I sent a 
draft of this paper to all those who had published empirical research on this topic, providing that 
recent addresses were available. I contacted the lead author if an address was available, otherwise a 
co-author. I did not contact authors of papers that were discovered and added to the list after this 
survey. In the letter I asked ?Do I summarize your work properly, and if not, what changes should I 
make?@ and ?Are you aware of any empirical work that I should include?@ I heard from authors of 32 
papers (counting five by myself and co-authors). I mark these papers with ?R@ at the end of the 
reference. Typically the authors agreed with my interpretations, but occasionally they made 
suggestions to clear up minor errors of interpretation. 
 
 Quality Control 
Here is how the current quality control system works. Researchers, sometimes working in 
teams, spend hundreds of hours working on a specialized topic, often collecting empirical evidence 
and applying formal analytical techniques. They write papers and often benefit from pre-submission 
peer reviews. They strive to follow standards for scientific work and they sign their names to their 
work. Their futures depend to some extent on the quality of their paper.  
These papers are then reviewed by people who are working in related areas but generally not 
on that same problem. So the reviewers typically have less experience with the problem than do the 
authors. Of course, there may be aspects of the research, such as methodology, in which the 
reviewers have more expertise.  
Reviewers generally work without extrinsic rewards. Their names are not revealed, so their 
reputations do not depend on their doing high quality reviews. Perhaps this leads them to spend little 
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time on their reviews. In any event, on average, reviewers spend between two and six hours in 
reviewing a paper (Jauch & Wall 1989; King, McDonald & Roderer 1981; Lock & Smith 1990; 
Yankauer 1990), although they often wait for months before doing their reviews. They seldom use 
structured procedures. Rarely do they contribute new data or conduct analyses. Typically, they are 
not held accountable for following proper scientific procedures. They match their opinions against 
the scientific work by the authors. 
Reviewers= recommendations often differ from one another, as shown by Cicchetti (1991). 
Most authors have probably experienced this. For example, here are reviews for one of my papers: 
Referee #1: ? . . . The paper is not deemed scientific enough to merit publication.@ Referee #2: ? . . 
This follows in the best tradition of science that encourages debate through replication.@ 
Authors are critical of the quality of the reviews that they receive. Bradley (1981) asked 
authors about their experience on the ?last compulsorily revised article published in a refereed 
journal.@ When asked whether the changes advocated by the referees were based on ?whim, bias, or 
personal preference,@ only 23% said none were, while 31% said that this applied to some important 
changes. Forty percent of the respondents said that some of the referees had not read the paper 
carefully. 
Given this background, it is interesting that editors decide whether to publish a paper 
primarily based on two or three reviews. Authors may appeal the decision, and some journals have 
formal procedures for appeal, but I suspect that editors rarely change decisions.2 The editors of the  
American Sociological Review agreed with the authors on only 13% of the decisions that were 
appealed (Simon, Bakanic & McPhail 1986).  
                                                           
2 I consider myself fortunate in this regard as editors have over-ruled referees for most of my important papers. 
When I went through my list of refereed journal articles and picked what I though to be the 20 most important papers, I 
found that none of them had received all favorable reviews. (In many of these cases I urged the editors to publish the 
negative reviews and my response). On the other hand, about half of the 20 next most important papers had all favorable 
reviews. 
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Using peer reviewers to control quality seems most appropriate for papers that contain little 
that is new. If researchers are pioneering new areas, or if their findings depart from what reviewers 
currently know in an area, reviewers will have difficulties. To the extent that findings are new, the 
expertise of the reviewers is likely to be less than that of the authors. 
A distressing aspect of the current quality control system is that work by the best researchers 
is, on average, judged by those who are less capable. This occurs if editors pick randomly from 
among potential reviewers (a ?fair@ procedure). Of course, some editors may ask their best reviewers 
to examine papers by authors with good reputations. 
 
False Cues 
Reviewers appear to base their judgments on cues that have only a weak relation to quality. 
Such cues include (1) statistical significance,  (2) large sample sizes, (3) complex procedures, and 
(4) obscure writing. Researchers might use these cues to gain acceptance of marginal papers 
(Armstrong 1982).  
Although it typically has little relationship to whether the findings are important, correct, or 
useful, statistical significance plays a strong role in publication decisions as shown by studies in 
management, psychology, and medicine (Begg & Berlin 1988;  Greenwald 1975; Hubbard & 
Armstrong 1992; Salsburg 1985;  Sterling, Rosenbaum, & Weinkam 1995). The case against 
statistical significance is summarized for psychologists by Cohen (1994) and for economists by 
McCloskey & Ziliak (1996).  If the purpose is to give readers an idea of the uncertainty associated 
with a finding, confidence intervals would be more appropriate than significance tests.  
Atkinson, Furlong & Wampold (1982) conducted an experiment to determine whether 
reviewers place too much emphasis on statistical significance. They prepared three versions of a 
bogus manuscript where identical findings differed by the level of statistical significance. The 
reviewers recommended rejection of the paper with nonsignificant findings three times as often as 
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the ones with significant findings. Interestingly, they based their decision to reject on the design of 
the study, but the design was the same for all versions. 
Using significance tests in publication decisions will lead to a bias in what is published. As 
Sterling (1959) noted, when studies with nonsignificant results are not published, researchers may 
continue to study that issue until, by chance, a significant result occurs. This problem still exists 
(Sterling, Rosenbaum & Weinkam 1995). 
Large sample sizes are used inappropriately. Sometimes they are unnecessary. For example, 
reviewers often confuse expert opinion studies with surveys of attitudes and intentions. While 
attitudes and intentions surveys might require a sample of more than a thousand individuals, expert 
opinion studies, which ask how others would respond, require only 5 to 20 experts (Armstrong 1985, 
p. 96). Even when sample size is relevant, it is likely to be given too much weight. For example, Lau 
(1994), in a study of election polls for the U.S. presidency, concluded that the sample size of the 
surveys was loosely related to their accuracy. 
Complex procedures serve as a favorable cue for reviewers. One wonders whether simpler 
procedures would suffice. For example, in the field of forecasting, where it is possible to assess the 
effectiveness of alternate methods, complex procedures seldom help and they sometimes harm 
accuracy (Armstrong 1985). Nevertheless, papers with complex procedures dominate the forecasting 
literature. 
Obscure writing impresses academics. I asked professors to evaluate selections from 
conclusions from four published papers (Armstrong 1980). For each paper, they were randomly 
assigned either a complex version (using big words and long sentences, but holding content 
constant), the original text, or a simpler version. The professors gave higher ratings to authors of the 
most obscure passages. Apparently, such writing, being difficult to understand, leads the reader to 
conclude that the writer must be very intelligent. Obscure writing also makes it difficult for 
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reviewers and readers to find errors and to assess importance. To advance their careers, then, 
researchers who do not have something important to say can obfuscate. 
 
Effects of Journal Peer Review on Quality 
Journal peer review improves the quality of a given paper. In the author survey by 
MacNealy, Speck & Clements (1994), 80% of the 96 authors responding said that they found the 
reviewers= suggested revisions to be ?reasonable.@ Bradley (1981), in a survey of 361 statisticians 
and psychologists, found that 72% thought that ?The net effect of refereeing upon the quality of the 
article was to improve it.@ Fletcher and Fletcher (1997) report on an experiment comparing medical 
research manuscripts as they were received with the same manuscripts after being revised based on 
reviewing and editing. Raters (who were blind to the treatment) concluded that the revised papers 
were superior on 33 of 34 elements of quality. Fletcher and Fletcher also report on a study showing 
that, surprisingly, editing did little to improve readability (the papers remained obscure). 
Peer reviewing improves the quality of papers, but its value in making comparisons across 
papers is less obvious. Gottfredson (1978), using from one to three experts per paper, found that 
their ratings of the ?quality@ of 387 published psychology papers had a weak relationship to the 
number of times they were cited over an eight-year period. 
Although journal peer review improves quality, it does not assure it. It seems likely that 
errors can be found in any published paper. Consider such a simple measure of quality as the 
accuracy of references. Evans, Nadjari & Burchell (1990) studied the references cited in three 
medical journals and found a 48% error rate. They said that ?a detailed analysis of quotation errors 
raises doubt in many cases that the original reference was read by the authors.@ Eichorn and 
Yankauer (1987) found that 31% of the references in public health journals contained errors, and 3% 
of these were such that they could not locate the references. In addition and more important, Eichorn 
and Yankauer found that the authors= descriptions of previous studies differed from the original 
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authors= interpretations for 30% of the citations, with half of these descriptions bring unrelated to the 
authors= contentions. 
Horrobin=s (1982) opinion, as editor of two biomedical journals, was that only one-third of 
reviews are accurate.  In an analysis of 216 reviews for 108 manuscripts on reading and language, 
Fagan (1990) concluded that reviewers made mistakes.  
Murray  (1988) evaluated the statistical procedures described in 28 papers that had been 
published in the British Journal of Surgery and concluded that four papers should have been 
rejected, seven needed major revisions, and 11 needed minor changes. Thus, only 21% of the papers 
passed this post-publication peer review without the need for changes. 
Stewart and Feder (1987) provide further evidence of errors in published papers. They 
studied the 18 papers published by John Darsee between 1978 and 1981, shortly before he admitted 
to scientific fraud. The papers had been reviewed and published in major biomedical journals. 
Stewart and Feder found errors in 16 of the 18 papers. On  average, they found 12 errors per paper, 
some minor, but many were major. For example, it was reported that the father in one family had his 
first child at age eight and the next at age nine. 
The reviewers= ability to identify even such major transgressions as plagiarism seems weak. 
Epstein (1990) conducted an experiment whereby he sent out two modifications of a previously 
published paper that were intentionally flawed methodologically. They were sent to journals in 
social work, sociology, psychology, counseling, and medicine. Only two of the 110 journals to 
which he sent it said that the paper had already been published. This occurred despite the fact that 
the paper had been cited frequently. Although the study=s control group had been omitted from the 
original paper, few reviewers mentioned this as a problem. Epstein concluded that only six of the 33 
reviews that were received were competently done. 
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One can find evidence of errors by looking at replications. If an original study and a 
replication reach different conclusions, then one is likely to be in error. How often does this occur?  
Hubbard & Vetter (1996), in their study of 266 replications and extensions in accounting, 
economics, finance, management, and marketing, found that 46% of them conflicted in a major way 
with the original findings, and an additional 27% conflicted to a minor extent. While this suggests a 
problem, we cannot infer the extent of the problem because editors might be biased against or in 
favor of publishing failed replications, or authors might tend to replicate studies that are excellent or 
that are flawed. 
        In a study of papers published in the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Dewald, Thursby 
& Anderson (1986) obtained computer programs and data from authors of studies published in 
economics and attempted to replicate the results.  They found that errors in transcription, data 
transformation, and computer programming were commonplace and that some of these errors 
significantly changed the statistical results and conclusions of the studies examined. 
 
 Fairness 
Given that publication is so important in academic hiring and promotion decisions, the issue 
of fairness receives much attention. Almost half of the empirical papers on journal reviewing listed 
by Speck (1993) address it. 
One belief is that authors should receive the same treatment as one another. This does not 
always happen. Peters & Ceci (1982) conducted a quasi-experiment in which they concluded that 
reviewers were biased against authors from unknown or less-prestigious institutions. The results of 
this  experiment were surprising. When I showed this design to  a group of 22 academic researchers 
as a proposed study, they did poorly at predicting the results (Armstrong 1982). For example, they 
expected that 46% of the studies would be rejected as ?adding nothing new.@ In fact, none were.   
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Lloyd (1990) conducted an experiment in which she sent for reviews on the identical 
manuscript on psychology with names that were obviously male or female (all fictitious) . She found 
that female-authored manuscripts were accepted significantly more often by female reviewers (62%) 
than by male reviewers (21%). 
Journals clarify and standardize the rules to try to ensure that all authors get the same 
treatment. One apparent aspect of fairness is that the opinions of reviewers, rather than the editor, 
should determine the disposition of the paper. But with this policy, the decision is heavily influenced 
by people who have little concern for the ability of the journal to interest its readers. 
Editors who are concerned about fairness often treat referees= recommendations as votes. In a 
fair procedure, then, a paper with all positive reviews should be published and one with all negative 
reviews should be rejected. The papers with mixed reviews can then be ranked on the proportion and 
strength of favorable reviews. For the most prestigious journals, where the supply of papers is high, 
the journal is likely to be filled with papers that have all positive reviews. Kupfersmid and 
Wonderly's (1994, p. 56) summary of four empirical studies led them to conclude that papers that 
received mixed reviews have a low probability of being published. Three additional studies are 
relevant: In a study of 263 blind reviews for the Journal of Counseling Psychology from 1982 
through 1983,  Munley, Sharkin & Gelso (1988) found that the editors= decisions to publish were 
highly correlated with reviewers= recommendations. Marsh and Ball (1989) obtained similar results. 
Bakanic, McPhail & Simon (1990) evaluated the manuscripts submitted to the American 
Sociological Review from 1977 to 1982 and found that ?a single recommendation to reject often 
resulted in a rejection.@ 
One approach to improving fairness has been to use more reviewers (Cicchetti 1991). This 
would make it more difficult to publish innovative papers in the leading journals because it is more 
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likely that a reviewer would provide a negative review. Interestingly, the lack of reliability in 
reviews should improve the chances for the publication of papers with innovative findings. 
 
Blind Reviewing 
Double-blind reviews (referred to as <blind reviews= below) are used to help ensure that 
papers by unknown researchers or by researchers from less prestigious institutions are reviewed 
fairly. Blind reviewing is popular, as shown by Rowney & Zenisek=s (1980) survey of researchers in 
psychology.  
The evidence on the effect of blind reviewing is mixed. Blank (1991) conducted a 
randomized experiment on peer review for economics journals and found that the acceptance rates of 
submissions by authors at top-ranked and at low-ranked universities did not differ much whether or 
not the reviewing was blind.  
Fletcher and Fletcher (1997) report on experiments with blind review. In one study of 123 
papers on medicine, blinding was successful in shielding the authors= identity for 73% of the papers. 
Reviews by blinded reviewers were judged by the editors to be higher in overall quality. The authors 
of the papers judged the blinded reviewers to be more knowledgeable than those where the authors= 
identities were known. They also thought the blinded reviewers were fairer. 
After studying peer reviews for the Journal of General Internal Medicine, McNutt et al. 
(1990) found little difference between blinded and nonblinded reviews with respect to 
recommendations about publication. However, the editors who rated the reviews thought that the 
nonblinded reviews were more constructive and more courteous, and authors rated them as fairer. 
Blind reviewing discards important information: namely, whether the researcher has been 
successful in prior efforts. This is useful for predicting the impact of a paper. For example, Abrams 
(1991), who looked at research by ecologists, found that citations for a researcher=s publications 
were highly correlated to the citation rates achieved by his or her previous papers.  
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If reviewers were biased in favor of those at prestigious institutions, then these papers should 
be of lower quality than those from less prestigious institutions. We have no evidence that this 
occurs. In fact, Perlman (1982) studied 120 papers from two psychology journals and found that 
papers by authors at institutions with higher status were cited much more frequently than papers by 
authors at lower-status institutions. Thus, Perlman concluded that blinding harms quality. 
An insistence that referees should not know the authors of papers that they review has an 
unfortunate consequence. It discourages researchers from seeking informal peer review from those 
who are probably best qualified to help them, because the researchers may not want them to be ruled 
out as referees. 
Some management journals practice an extreme form of blind review. They request that 
referees disqualify themselves if they think they know who the authors are. This poses a problem for 
well-respected authors because competent researchers in the field will recognize their work. Only 
those ignorant of the literature would be able to provide reviews for leading researchers. 
 
 Innovation 
By innovative studies, I mean those with evidence that existing beliefs are incorrect. More 
generally, innovation refers to all advances in scientific knowledge. I am concerned with important 
innovations; trivial new findings threaten no one and are unlikely to offend reviewers.   
At first glance, one might wonder whether innovation poses a problem. I think that we are all 
in favor of publishing innovative papers. Indeed, a survey of journal reviewers in 43 disciplines 
found that ?originality@ was the first-ranked consideration in reviewing papers (Juhasz et al. 1975).  
In a survey of Canadian psychologists, Rowney & Zenisek (1980) found that they would evaluate 
favorably papers with a ?new, original theory.@ Kerr, Tolliver & Petree (1972) obtained similar 
findings in their survey of board members for 19 journals in management and social sciences. Beyer, 
Chanove & Fox (1995) found that 18% of the authors they surveyed claimed novelty in their papers, 
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and this was correlated positively (though weakly) with the final decision on acceptance. It is 
unlikely, then, that there is an intentional bias against innovation.  
Kuhn (1962) claimed that when innovative findings conflict with important beliefs, 
resistance is likely to be strong and long lasting. Barber (1961) describes the fierce resistance met by 
famous scientists. Resistance seems endless for some for important issues. For example, protestors 
said that Rushton should not be allowed to present his findings on brain size and intelligence 
(Rushton & Ankney 1996) at the AAAS meetings in Baltimore in February 1996. The protests were 
so strong it was deemed necessary to provide security guards. This occurred even though  similar 
Aundesirable@  findings have been published since the late 1800s.  
 Horrobin (1990) examined important new findings in medical science and concluded that 
journals= emphasis on quality control often led to extensive delays in their publication. He also 
concluded that the stress on quality leads reviewers to ignore the importance of the study. 
Reviewers tend to reject papers that provide important new findings. Experimental studies in 
psychology support this viewpoint. For example, Goodstein and Brazis (1970) asked 282 
psychologists to review one of two abstracts that were identical except for the results. The 
psychologists rated those in which the results were in accord with their own beliefs as better 
designed and said that they were more suitable for publication. Mahoney (1977) showed that 
reviewers rejected papers with controversial findings because, they said, the methodology was poor, 
while they accepted papers with identical methodology that supported conventional beliefs. 
Experiments by Abramowitz et al. (1975) and Epstein (1990) yielded evidence that was consistent 
with Mahoney=s. In laboratory experiments with graduate students and practicing scientists, Koehler 
(1993) found that, when given results on a controversial issue, they rated the quality of a research 
report higher if it agreed with their prior beliefs. In a nonexperimental study, Smart (1964) found 
that 30% of studies in doctoral dissertations in psychology failed to support a dominant hypothesis, 
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but this dropped to 20% of papers presented at the annual American Psychological Conference, and 
to 10% of papers published in journals. 
In a survey of the editors of 16 leading American Psychological Association journals, 
Armstrong and Hubbard (1991) found that papers with controversial findings were harshly reviewed. 
For the two-year period covered by the survey, only one paper with controversial findings received 
favorable reviews from all reviewers. The editor revealed that he had been determined to publish the 
paper, so he had sought referees that he thought would provide favorable reviews. This represents 
one favorably reviewed paper with controversial findings for 32 <journal years.=  
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that it is common for reviewers to reject ground-breaking 
papers. Gans and Shepherd (1994), in their survey of famous economists, conclude that leading 
journals stifle innovative work. Garcia (1981) provides similar examples in psychology.  
Campanario (1995) describes examples in which ?citation classics@ were rejected by the journal to 
which they were first submitted. He concludes that ?something must be wrong with the peer review 
system when an expert considers that a manuscript is not of enough interest and it later becomes a 
classic in its discipline@ (p. 321). 
While one could argue that innovations should be subject to more careful scrutiny and that 
they will eventually be published anyway, it is just as easy to develop arguments why such studies 
should be published more quickly. Given the current situation, the barriers might be so great that 
researchers become discouraged and decide it is more rewarding to focus on their own advancement 
rather than the advancement of science. Why invest time working on an important problem if it 
might lead to controversial results that are difficult to publish? 
 
 Possible Changes in Journal Reviewing 
The following changes in peer review might encourage the publication of innovative work. 
They are intended to lead to improvements in papers and to avoid the rejection of papers with 
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innovative findings. The suggestions are arranged roughly in the order of the decisions in the 
reviewing process. 
 
 Invited Papers 
Given that peer reviewers pose barriers for innovations, journals might reduce peer reviewing 
as a screening device. One way is to make greater use of invited papers. This could be done for a 
section of a journal or for at least one journal in a field. For example, the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (JEP) asks well-established researchers to address important problems. These invited 
papers usually receive informal peer review (to improve quality) at the request of the author or the 
editor. While the JEP publishes some papers that it does not solicit, this is unusual (many are 
submitted, but few are accepted). The JEP has become highly regarded and its papers are often cited.  
 Rodman & Mancini (1977) surveyed editors of journals in education and found the practice 
of inviting papers to be widespread; 89% of the 28 editors who responded had published ?inside 
track submissions.@3 After surveying papers published in six leading technical communication 
journals, MacNealy, Speck, & Clements (1994) concluded that editors had solicited over one-fourth 
of their published papers. When inviting papers, editors can rely heavily on researchers who have a 
good track record and who are presumably interested in maintaining their reputations. Editors can 
also encourage and assist authors in obtaining peer review. 
Unfortunately, I could find no evidence on whether invited papers are better or worse than 
those that go through normal channels. One might, for example, compare citation rates for papers 
from each category. 
 
Early Acceptance Procedures 
                                                           
3 Rodman and Mancini concluded that the practice of inside submissions is unethical and it should be banned. 
They did not examine the impact that this might have on the communication of scientific findings. 
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Editors could accept papers based only on a review of the research design. This might 
encourage submission of papers that will produce innovative findings. Given acceptance, the 
researcher would then have to carry out the design as specified. The eventual paper would be 
published irrespective of the results. Presumably, then, editors would want to accept studies that 
would be interesting no matter how the results turned out.  
With an early acceptance procedure, researchers could find out whether it was worthwhile to 
do research on a controversial topic before they invested much time. An additional benefit of such a 
review is that they receive suggestions from reviewers before doing the work and can then improve 
the design. A paper accepted under this procedure, when completed, would again be sent for review 
to improve quality. Revisions might be requested, say for the writing, but the paper would still be 
considered as accepted.   
Weiss (1989) used an ?advance publication review@  procedure for Applied Psychological 
Measurement. He expected that this procedure would improve efficiency by allowing researchers to 
work on projects that would be published. He ended this trial in 1996 for lack of interest (personal 
communication). Authors had submitted only five papers under this procedure and they did not 
tackle topics that were controversial; Weiss speculates that this is because the journal specializes in 
methodology and controversy is rare in this field. 
 
Simultaneous Submissions 
Currently, many journals review papers on the condition that they are not being reviewed 
elsewhere. Simultaneous submissions would speed up the reviewing process, because the journal 
that is first to accept is likely to gain the paper for publication. This would reward efficiency in the 
operation of journals. For a favorable view of this proposal, see Szenberg (1994); for an unfavorable 
one, see Pressman (1994); and, for a balanced view, see Lindsey (1978).   
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Authors often submit scientific books to several publishers simultaneously. A trial of this 
procedure might help journal to assess such questions as: Are there enough reviewers? Would 
journals act in haste? Would authors take the easy road and avoid revisions that could greatly 
enhance the value of their research? One way that this could begin would be for two or more 
journals to allow for simultaneous submissions. If this works well, other journals might join in the 
agreement. 
 
Pre-submission Reviews 
In their instructions to authors, journals might state a preference for papers that have been 
reviewed by the authors= peers before submission. Reviews by established researchers, presentations 
at research conferences, and publication in proceedings would be favorable signs for those 
concerned about quality.  
 
Nomination of Reviewers by Authors 
Researchers usually know who has expertise on their topic. Therefore, journals might 
encourage them to nominate reviewers for their paper, particularly for papers with  controversial 
findings. Some journals, including Science, Organization Science, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin  (Hendrick 1976), and the Journal of Molecular Biology invite authors to 
suggest reviewers. 
 
Results-blind Reviews 
Given the evidence of bias against papers with controversial findings, researchers in some 
disciplines have suggested results-blind reviewing (e.g., Newcombe, 1987, recommends it for 
medical research). Here, authors are invited to provide a version of the paper with the results and 
conclusions omitted. If the editor believes that the paper is concerned with an important topic, he 
would give the reviewers a version with results and conclusions omitted. This procedure should also 
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help to reduce reviewers= bias against papers that do not have statistically significant results and to 
reject statistically significant but unimportant studies.  
The International Journal of Forecasting currently allows for results-blind reviews. One 
would expect that such a procedure would rarely be needed. Not surprisingly, few authors have used 
this option. The intent, however, is to have it available for the few cases where it might help. Also, 
the availability of this option helps to protect editors against claims that they are arbitrarily biased 
against new findings. 
 
Structured Reviewer Forms 
Because reviewers often use false cues, journals should explicitly describe the cues that 
should be evaluated. Structured rating sheets can emphasize a preference for papers having 
comparative empirical studies, important topics, and surprising results. The structured rating sheet 
might also tell reviewers what to ignore. The American Psychological Association is considering the 
elimination of significance tests from papers submitted to its journals because they often serve as a 
false cue of quality (Shea 1996). 
Reviewers appear to seek reasons why a paper should not be published. The presumption 
behind this quality control system is that it is important to protect other scientists from encountering 
 flawed work. To knowingly publish a paper with major errors is regarded as scientific misconduct. 
However, Chalmers (1990) suggests that the failure to report important findings might also be 
regarded as scientific misconduct. This seems obvious, for example, if a researcher obtained findings 
that a currently used medical treatment has serious undesirable side effects that had not previously 
been realized. This principle also applies to other areas. For example, what if a widely-used 
procedure in management is harmful? I obtained such evidence in a study of the Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG) product portfolio matrix. This was the first experimental evaluation of a technique that 
had been widely used for almost a quarter century. My paper went through seven rounds of reviews, 
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with fourteen referees, at four journals before it was accepted after a three-year reviewing process. 
While the reviewing led to additional experiments and to improvements in the writing, no errors 
were discovered and no substantive changes occurred in the conclusions (Armstrong 1996). To 
counter a bias of looking more closely for errors when there are important new findings, it might be 
worthwhile to structure the reviewer form so that it asks why a paper should be published. The 
International Journal of Forecasting asks this on its reviewer=s form.  
Given an apparent bias toward papers that support existing beliefs, authors might be 
encouraged to report evidence that opposes their findings. Referees can examine whether the author 
provides a complete and unbiased review of prior research. For example, I (Armstrong 1996) found 
that the ten researchers who reported confirming results in their extensions of escalation bias (which 
states that managers invest more heavily if a project goes bad) failed to cite any of the four published 
papers that contained disconfirming results. 
To avoid acceptance decisions based on voting and to encourage ideas about improvements, 
journals should not ask reviewers for recommendations about whether the paper should be 
published. Instead, the rating form would direct reviewers to suggest ways to enhance quality. The 
editor-in-chief would make the publication decision, or in broad fields, associate editors could be 
given this responsibility. The editors must decide which papers are relatively most important. 
 
Open Peer Review 
One way to seek innovation is for editors to publish controversial papers along with 
comments by reviewers, as is done by Behavioral and Brain Sciences  (Harnad 1979).  A section 
editor could be allocated space for finding papers with innovative findings and publishing them 
along with commentary. The risk of publishing a paper that could be in error is balanced by 
providing the readers with commentary.  
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Journals can encourage open review by providing space for replication studies, corrections of 
errors, commentaries on previous papers, and letters to the editor. These procedures are used by 
some prestigious journals such as Science, Nature, Journal of Economic Perspectives, and the 
American Psychologists. In some fields, such as management, journals make little use of these 
procedures. Furthermore, Hubbard and Armstrong (1994) found that the proportion of published 
comments in leading marketing journals declined by one-third between 1974-79 and 1980-89. 
Journal policies can make a difference. The Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics 
announced in 1984 that it would give priority to the publication of replications and extensions and 
this led to a substantial increase in the number of replication studies that they publish (Fuess 1996).  
Journal policies should give special attention to procedures for informing the scientific 
community about major errors, mistakes, or fraud in journal articles. Pfeifer & Snodgrass (1990) 
studied 82 papers that had been published between 1973 and 1987 but were later retracted. They 
concluded that papers were not being purged from the literature effectively, as they continued to be 
cited favorably. Friedman (1990), who studied fraudulent research by Slutsky, concluded that 
existing procedures made it difficult to track corrections and that some journals fail to publish 
corrections. Major errors can have a continued existence long after publication, as shown by such 
well-known examples as the Cyril Burt case (Wade 1976) and others (Broad & Wade 1982).  
 
Alternate Formats 
Editors often justify their use of peer review for screening as the best way to allocate scarce 
space in journals. In many fields, however, journals devote space not to reporting on scientific 
findings but to researchers= ?proposals.@ In management and social science journals, for example, a 
large percentage of the papers contain elaborate descriptions of models or methods or phenomena. 
These are presented with logical arguments or with complex mathematical descriptions. The authors 
conclude with suggestions that someone should test their proposals. Seldom does another researcher 
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take up the challenge. Journals could free up a lot of space if they announced that they would publish 
proposals only after they have been tested. The papers could then focus on presenting findings. They 
could put important technical details in small print in an appendix, or they could be put on file with 
the editors and interested readers could write for details. For example, Nature, as a condition of 
publication, requires that the materials and methods used in the study be ?freely available to 
academic researchers for their own use.@ (Perhaps you can estimate how many researchers would 
request details for the typical paper published in your field.) Should the demand for such details be 
large, the details could be published. One promising option is to make details available through 
electronic publication, as is being done by some journals, such as Interfaces.  
If the focus is on scientific advancement and communication, editors might change their 
orientation from deciding whether to publish a paper, to determining how much of the paper should 
be published. This could range from publishing only the title, to an abstract, an extended abstract, a 
note, a short paper, or a long paper. In each case, information would be provided about how to get 
more details, perhaps using the Internet. Nature allows for five types of publications ranging from 
peer-reviewed ?scientific correspondence@ (500 word maximum) to ?review articles@ (six page 
maximum). Science  offers eight different categories. 
Electronic publishing by journals will do much to solve the problem of scarce resources. It 
will become inexpensive to disseminate papers. Electronic publishing may gradually supplant paper 
journals as a primary channel for innovative findings. It can reduce time lags and make the findings 
more accessible. Formal editorial boards can review these papers and, given the low cost of on-line 
space, they could recommend publication along with a summary judgment to guide readers and 
evaluators. Authors could then decide whether to publish the paper, summary judgment, and 
reviews, or to also include a reply to the reviewers, or to withdraw the paper.  
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Electronic publication should also aid in post-publication review. It would be inexpensive to 
include peer reviews. Readers can publish comments on papers. Records might be kept of the 
number of times a paper is accessed and how many errors are found. For an example of such a 
publication on the Internet, see Hibbitts (1996a), which addresses issues of peer review in the legal 
profession. Hibbitts= electronic paper offers advantages over its paper version.4 
Hibbitts (1996b) discusses various aspects of electronic publication for law reviews.5 He 
discusses the resistance to electronic publication and draws an analogy to the negative reaction of 
many scholars when the printing press was introduced. Despite some resistance, journals in physics 
(Taubes 1994), biology, management, and other areas have begun to use electronic publishing in 
various ways. 
 
 Actions by Editors, Reviewers, and Authors 
The selection of an editor is perhaps the most important decision that a journal makes.  
Franke, Edlund and Oster=s  (1990) analysis of 17 management journals over a 12-year period led 
                                                           
4 Although we do not know the number of readers of the paper version of Hibbitts= (1996a) paper, it is likely to 
be only a small fraction of those who read the electronic version. In its first year, the electronic version was accessed by 
over 3,200 people. 
5 To be sure, law reviews differ in many ways from scientific journals. Perhaps the most obvious difference is 
that the editors are students. 
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them to conclude that a journal was more successful if the editor was a successful researcher. Based 
on the discussion above, journals should avoid the selection of bureaucrats. 
In order for innovative papers to be published, editors should take an active role. Roediger 
(1987) suggests that editors can have a strong influence by encouraging the submission of papers 
that would otherwise be unseen or unwritten.6 He refers to the editor as a scientific scout who would 
seek papers with innovative findings and find reviewers who will provide constructive and objective 
reviews. Some journals actively seek to publish controversial papers. These include Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, IEEE  (Christiansen 1978), the International Journal of Forecasting, and 
Psychological Bulletin.  
Editors may need to take risks on important issues. Arkes (1996) suggests that it may help 
journals to publish innovative papers if a board of editors makes decisions rather than a single editor. 
In addition, he suggests that reviewers be told in advance that their reviews would be examined by 
the board and be informed about who wrote the reviews. A study by Tetlock and Kim (1987) 
suggests that such accountability is likely to improve the quality of judgments. 
Editors need to judge the reviewers= work and to hold reviewers to the same standards of 
science that they expect of authors. Liversidge (1989) presents an example, where he, as editor, 
published a controversial paper about AIDS, because although the reviewers were negative, they 
could not support their position. In addition, authors should be permitted to review the reviewers. If 
errors are noted in the reviews, consideration should be given for additional reviews. Such a policy 
is informally adopted by many journals, and Science has this as an explicit policy. 
Even if editors do not rely on reviewers for recommendations, they can still use them to help 
ensure that papers are fairly free of errors. They should guard against biased research findings by 
                                                           
6 Papers with findings on peer review appear to be difficult to publish. I would not have attempted to write this 
current paper had it not been solicited. That said, I sought, and received much pre-submission peer review. The editor 
also had the paper reviewed by two anonymous reviewers. 
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requiring that authors and reviewers report funding sources and potential sources of bias (Chalmers, 
Frank & Reitman 1990). Davidson (1986), Cho and Bero (1996), and Needleman (1992) show how 
such bias affects findings in medical research. 
Much of the discouragement of  innovative work stems from reviewers. Reviewers can avoid 
this by adopting a role to try to improve papers. In doing so, they would not make a recommendation 
as to whether the paper should be published. In my own reviewing of papers, I no longer make 
recommendations about acceptance. I thus remove myself as a barrier to publication and do not 
reject my colleagues= papers. The decision rests on the editor, who can choose from among many 
papers without being constrained by my ?vote.@ This practice fits with my policy as a reviewer of 
generally revealing my identity to authors. 
Some journals solicit innovative work, but few researchers avail themselves of this 
opportunity. If authors are determined to work on topics that might challenge existing beliefs, they 
now have the opportunity to self-publish electronically. Without certification from a journal, 
however, it may be difficult to attract a readership. Readers will be searching for evidence of quality, 
so the author=s reputation will be an important cue. This suggests that authors would not want to 
publish work of low quality. The readership of the paper, readers= comments, and reviews might 
serve as further useful cues to potential readers. 
  Authors should seek peer reviews before submitting papers for publication. This is an 
important part of the research process. For example, in preparing this paper, I sent copies to 45 
people to seek peer review, and 26 made comments.  As an editor and reviewer, I sometimes wish 
that all researchers relied on pre-submission peer reviews, because it is often painfully obvious that 
they have not done so. My impressions are consistent with the findings of MacNealy, Speck & 
Clements (1994) in a survey of authors: For 96 papers published in leading technical communication 
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journals, 44% of the authors reported that they had not solicited opinions from colleagues before 
submission. 
It is distressing that authors often ignore peer review when their paper is rejected by a 
journal. Wilson (1978) found that 85% of the papers rejected by the Journal of Clinical Investigation 
were eventually published elsewhere, and the majority of these were either not changed or changed 
in only minor ways. Lock and Smith (1986) obtained similar results for papers rejected by the 
British Medical Journal.  Hargens (1990) reached a similar conclusion for papers in the social 
sciences. Yankauer (1985), in a study of 61 papers that had been rejected by another journal before 
they were submitted to the American Journal of Public Health, found that 48% had not been revised 
either moderately or substantially. Patterson & Smithey (1990), in a study of papers rejected by the 
American Political Science Review, concluded that of the 263 papers that were then submitted to 
another journal, 43% contained no revisions based upon the APSR reviews. 
 
 Effects of Changes on Quality and Fairness 
The above suggestions were made to increase the likelihood of publishing innovative 
findings. This section speculates on what the effects might be on quality and fairness.  
Some of the above changes put more emphasis on authors to ensure the quality of their paper. 
Those who don=t will have difficulty publishing further papers because editors would be less likely 
to be invite them, and editors and readers would also be wary of the quality of their work. 
The current system of journal peer review encourages authors to be concerned primarily 
about satisfying two or three reviewers. To satisfy these reviewers, authors might have to make 
changes that harm the paper. In Bradley=s (1981) author survey about the acceptance of their last 
manuscript that required changes, 27% of 348 psychologists and statisticians said that they made 
reviewers= changes even though they believed they were incorrect. My suggestions are designed to 
orient authors to consider what might happen with post-publication peer review. 
  27
The current practice of giving the responsibility of peer review to two or three reviewers 
might lead editors, authors, and readers to conclude that once the paper is accepted, its quality is 
established. I, like others, have been frustrated when asking journals to publish corrections for 
published papers. The proposed policy changes should facilitate corrections.  
If journal peer review led authors to forgo seeking pre-submission peer review, the net effect 
on quality might be negative. For example, in Bradley (1981)  psychologists and statisticians were 
asked ?In writing your next article, if you knew that instead of being refereed, it would be published 
as you submitted it (except for changes to conform to the journal=s format), how careful would you 
be in preparing it?@ 21% said more careful, six percent said less, and the remainder said equally 
careful. 
Post-publication review can help to provide a fair assessment of authors for hiring and 
promotion decisions. Citation indices are particularly helpful for assessing the quality of work some 
years after its publication. Citations seem to generally be positive; Spiegel-Rosing (1977) analyzed 
citations to papers in Science Studies from 1971 through 1974 and found less than one-half of one 
percent of the citations were negative. To focus attention on citations, the Administrative Science 
Quarterly offers a prize for authors of its most frequently cited papers over a five-year period.  
Some of the changes I have discussed, especially those listed under ?alternate formats,@ 
would decrease the use of paper counts for evaluating researchers. This might lead to a greater 
emphasis on measures of impact, such as whether readers believe the findings to be important, 
whether the paper is read, whether it is cited by other researchers, whether others use the findings, 
and whether it contains serious errors. I see such criteria as aiding fairness in the evaluation of 
researchers. A paper that is ignored for ten years, say, might be considered to be of little value. 
Errors discovered after publication can be linked to the paper for easy access by evaluators. Authors 
would be motivated to provide papers that were free of errors because they would find it unpleasant 
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to have these errors publicized. Negative citations can alert the scientific community to 
shortcomings in published work. For example, citations to the fraudulent research by Breuning were 
mostly negative, and they were increasingly negative over time (Garfield & Welljams-Dorof 1990).  
 
 Conclusions 
Efforts by journals to ensure quality and fairness through peer review have not been overly 
successful. They also reduce the likelihood that important controversial findings will be published, 
or at least they delay them. This problem is expected to become worse as the number of submissions 
increases. Paradoxically, then, the increase in the number of submissions is expected to lead to a 
decrease in the proportion of published papers with innovative findings. This is consistent with the 
findings of Holub, Tappeiner & Eberharter (1991) that important papers are decreasing over time as 
a percentage of published papers. One would expect the most serious losses to occur for the leading 
journals. 
If we want to publish important innovative findings, then we should develop procedures to 
encourage this. Screening might be changed from a ?yes-no@ decision to a decision about how to 
report results. This means deciding how much space should be given, whether the journal should 
qualify its support by adding a note of caution, and whether the research should be published on 
paper, electronically, or both. 
Electronic publication by journals can address many of the problems associated with peer 
review, and it helps to solve the major problem in the current system, namely, the shortage of space. 
It will greatly reduce the cost of disseminating knowledge. This means that instead of screening 
papers, journals can simply publish the papers along with their judgment as to the worth of the 
research. Electronic publishing will also improve the ease of conducting post-publication peer 
review. 
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To increase the publication of innovative findings, steps can be taken by editors, reviewers, 
and authors. The rate of advancement of knowledge in science and engineering should increase 
rapidly as barriers to the publication of innovative research findings are reduced. That said, 
whenever journals change peer review procedures, I recommend that they make changes gradually 
and monitor the effects carefully. In addition to assessing changes in the number of innovative 
findings that are published, the effects on quality and fairness should be assessed. 
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